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Reviews of the Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, and Palau are not included in 
this issue.
Federated States  
of Micronesia
During the period covered by this 
review, the Federated States of Micro-
nesia (FSM) grappled with several 
significant challenges to its integrity 
as a functional government and a 
legal state—some long-standing, some 
newly borne, all symptoms of interna-
tional, regional, and domestic discord. 
The responses of the state govern-
ments and the FSM national govern-
ment revealed a persistent truth in the 
politics of the federation: solidarity 
outside, dissension within.
Leading the litany of challenges was 
the perennial—and existential—threat 
of climate change. In May 2013, 
climatologists measured atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide near 
the summit of Mauna Loa in Hawai‘i 
as exceeding 400 parts per million, 
the highest ever recorded (Carrington 
2013). In September 2013, Working 
Group i of the 5th Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (ipcc) released a 
major report on the physical science 
basis of climate change, wherein the 
group asserted that it is “extremely 
likely” that most of the observed 
increase in global average surface 
temperature over the last sixty years 
was due to “anthropogenic forcings” 
and predicted that the global sea level 
will rise at a rate very likely exceeding 
the already-alarming rate observed in 
the last forty years (ipcc 2013). The 
sea level in the FSM was measured 
to be rising by ten millimeters per 
year, more than three times the global 
 average, with predictions that it will 
rise up to six inches from the current 
level by 2030 (iccai 2013). King tides, 
storm surges, and coastal flooding 
have afflicted the FSM, contaminating 
farmland, ruining freshwater supplies, 
and disrupting island communities 
throughout the federation.
In this context, on 5 September 
2013, FSM representatives joined 
those from the fifteen other mem-
bers of the Pacific Islands Forum in 
endorsing the Majuro Declaration for 
Climate Leadership during the Forum 
meeting held in the Marshall Islands 
(pif 2013). The declaration announces 
the intent of Forum members to 
assume climate leadership, a mantle 
marked by ambitious greenhouse- 
gas-emission reductions and a regional 
transition to renewable and clean 
energy sources. Via its representatives, 
the FSM government committed to, 
among other things, halving the fed-
eration’s import and use of imported 
petroleum fuels by 2020, generating 
half the electricity needed for use in 
rural areas from renewable energy 
sources by the same year, and realizing 
a “net gain of area and health status 
of coral reefs” between 2013 and 
2020 (pif 2013).
The Pacific Islands Forum also 
featured a Declaration on Establishing 
a Pacific Regional Data Repository for 
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Sustainable Energy for All (se4all), 
which was introduced by Tonga and 
endorsed by all the Forum representa-
tives including those of the FSM. The 
se4all initiative is a global effort 
launched in 2010 by United Nations 
(UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
that aims to achieve three goals by 
2030: provide universal access to 
modern energy, double global energy 
efficiency, and double the share of 
global renewable energy. The declara-
tion endorsed by the Forum calls for 
the establishment of a central clearing-
house in the Pacific for information 
about sustainable energy best prac-
tices, in the hope of assisting Pacific 
states to reduce fuel imports, make 
energy services more affordable and 
efficient, and adopt broader sustain-
able energy portfolios, per the objec-
tives of the se4all initiative. Several 
weeks after the Forum concluded, 
FSM President Emanuel Mori held a 
bilateral meeting with Prime Minister 
Siale‘ataongo Tu‘ivakanō of Tonga in 
New York City in the margins of the 
opening of the 68th Session of the UN 
General Assembly, during which he 
signed the declaration on behalf of the 
FSM (fsmis, 24 Sept 2013).
In addition to adopting clear and 
ambitious national commitments to 
tackle climate change and its drivers 
under the Majuro Declaration and 
the se4all initiative, the FSM gov-
ernment continued its groundbreak-
ing work in tackling climate change 
through a somewhat unorthodox 
approach: reducing powerful green-
house gases called hydrofluorocarbons 
(hfcs), pursuant to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer. hfcs are potent, 
manmade greenhouse gases used 
primarily in refrigeration and air 
 conditioning. They are up to thou-
sands of times more harmful than 
carbon dioxide, though they are rela-
tively short-lived. In the past, the FSM 
(which is a state party to the Montreal 
Protocol) had proposed phasing out 
the use of hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
(or hcfcs, which are distinct from 
hfcs) under the protocol—a proposal 
that met with favorable responses 
from the international community 
and ultimately succeeded in reduc-
ing the targeted substances (fsmpio, 
18 Sept 2013). The FSM then turned 
its  attention to hfcs, which are not 
currently covered by the protocol. In 
2009, the FSM was the first coun-
try to propose phasing down hfcs 
by amending the Montreal Protocol 
to include provisions targeting the 
manufacturing of hfcs. In the past 
year, the proposal enjoyed broad sup-
port, including from the United States, 
China, and the rest of the Group of 
Twenty (g20), whose leaders publicly 
and jointly agreed on 6 September 
2013 to use the Montreal Protocol 
to phase out hfcs in their respective 
countries (Eilperin 2013).
The FSM also took advantage of 
the November 2013 Conference of 
Parties to the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (unfccc) in 
Warsaw, Poland, to further advocate 
for its proposal to amend the Mon-
treal Protocol. Noting growing inter-
national support for amending the 
protocol, Ambassador Jane J Chigiyal, 
the permanent FSM representative to 
the United Nations and a member of 
the Bureau of the unfccc Conference 
of Parties, stated that countries “have 
the same mutual goal to close the 
emissions gap and we think that doing 
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so through the Montreal Protocol to 
reduce hfcs would make a difference” 
(fsmis, 20 Nov 2013).
As groundbreaking and ripe for 
success as its work on the Montreal 
Protocol has been, the FSM continued 
to struggle to make any significant 
headway in unfccc negotiations. At 
the Conference of Parties in  Warsaw, 
the FSM negotiators followed the 
lead of the Republic of Nauru, which 
chaired the negotiating bloc of the 
Alliance of Small Island States (aosis). 
aosis advocated for, among other 
things, increased climate finance for 
mitigation and adaptation efforts in 
developing countries, as well as a 
“new international mechanism for loss 
and damage associated with climate 
change impacts.” Unfortunately, 
 developed countries refused to commit 
to interim deadlines for contributing 
the $100 billion they had promised 
in a previous Conference of Parties 
to give to the Green Climate Fund 
by 2020. (The fund has not received 
any contributions to date.) Developed 
countries also blocked the establish-
ment of a new “loss and damage” 
mechanism, citing concerns about 
assuming legal liability for harms 
inflicted by their greenhouse-gas 
emissions on developing countries. In 
the end, the Conference of Parties in 
 Warsaw was largely inconsequential, 
at least from the FSM perspective 
(c2es 2013). That bodes ill for the 
unfccc process, which is supposed 
to produce a new international legal 
instrument or “an agreed outcome 
with legal force” by December 2015 
(with entry into force no earlier 
than 2020) to update or replace the 
 battered Kyoto Protocol. It is doubtful 
whether such a monumental task can 
be achieved, at least to the satisfaction 
of the FSM and its aosis allies.
While struggling with a mixed 
bag of results in multilateral efforts 
to tackle climate change, the FSM 
government had success with domestic 
approaches. On 24 September 2013, 
the FSM Congress ratified the Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol 
(fsmis, 24 Sept 2013). The amend-
ment extends the emissions reductions 
commitment period of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol to 2020. The FSM government 
formally submitted its ratification to 
the depositary of the amendment on 
21 January 2014, becoming one of 
only seven states to do so.
Additionally, on 3 January 2014, 
the FSM government enacted the Cli-
mate Change Act. The act essentially 
obligates all sectors in the federation’s 
four states that are responsible for 
environment, disaster management, 
infrastructure, health, transportation, 
finance, and education to “main-
stream” climate-adaptation issues and 
approaches in their policies and action 
plans. Andrew Yatilman, the director 
of the FSM Office of Environment 
and Emergency Management, noted 
that “activities [related to disaster risk 
and climate change] tend to be carried 
out by staff separately, with climate 
change generally viewed more as an 
environmental issue. We are now in 
the process of realigning our pro-
gramme to make the two more com-
plimentary” (Wilson 2014). President 
Mori, when signing the act into law, 
stressed that “establishing a national 
policy in the area of climate change is 
essential in protecting our nation and 
furthering the interests and well-being 
of our people” (fsmis, 9 Jan 2014). 
The act is the first of its kind for a 
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Pacific small island state, falling neatly 
into the call of the Majuro Declaration 
for Pacific states to become “climate 
leaders.”
In tandem with its crusade against 
climate change, the FSM govern-
ment took steps to address the special 
stresses placed on the world’s oceans 
by irresponsible human activity. Of 
particular concern for the FSM was 
the effect of ocean acidification and 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
(iuu) fishing on the federation’s 
maritime food security and the health 
of the marine life in FSM waters. 
Throughout the year at the United 
Nations, where UN members and civil 
society continued negotiating Sustain-
able Development Goals to replace 
the current Millennium Development 
Goals in 2015, the FSM delegation 
championed the inclusion of a stand-
alone Sustainable Development Goal 
on the Ocean, which would establish 
benchmarks by which states can take 
concrete actions to ensure a healthy, 
productive, and resilient ocean for the 
global community (unesco 2014). 
From 22 to 25 April 2014, under-
scoring its commitment to the ocean, 
the FSM, represented by Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs Lorin S Robert, par-
ticipated in the Global Oceans Action 
Summit for Food Security and Blue 
Growth in The Hague, Netherlands. 
The summit gathered representatives 
from governments, civil society, the 
scientific community, coastal com-
munities, and the fishing industry 
to discuss several major threats to 
maritime health and food security: iuu 
fishing, pollution, and marine eco-
system destruction. Secretary Robert 
joined other participants in advocating 
for a so-called “blue economy,” which 
would generate food, jobs, and other 
opportunities through the conserva-
tion, sustainable management, and 
equitable utilization of the world’s 
oceans (Summit 2014).
Following on the heels of that 
summit, FSM representatives attended 
an international conference—“Our 
Ocean”—convened by the US Depart-
ment of State in Washington, dc, 
23–24 June 2014. Participants at 
the conference, including the United 
States, committed to preventing iuu 
fishing through improved tracking of 
fishing vessels and consumer educa-
tion about seafood choices; halting 
ocean acidification by curbing carbon 
dioxide emissions; and creating more 
marine protected areas by 2020 (Our 
Ocean 2014).
The conference marked the increas-
ing attention being paid by the highest 
echelons of the US government to the 
health of the ocean, as well as a keen 
sensitivity to the issues and concerns 
of the Pacific region at a time when 
the Barack Obama administration has 
found its pivot to Asia to be challeng-
ing. Indeed, a day after the conference 
concluded, US Secretary of State John 
Kerry attended Pacific Day celebra-
tions in Washington, dc, where he 
mingled with ambassadors, ministers, 
and other luminaries from the Pacific. 
During Pacific Day, Secretary Rob-
ert—who, along with Director Pat-
rick Mackenzie of the FSM National 
Oceanic Resources and Management 
Authority and FSM Ambassador to 
the United States Asterio Takesy, rep-
resented the FSM at the “Our Ocean” 
conference—remarked that it was “a 
cruel twist of fate” that the ocean has 
become a threat rather than succor for 
the people of Oceania due to rising 
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seas, erratic storm surges, and warm-
ing temperatures ruining coral reefs 
and diverting pelagic fish stocks from 
FSM waters (fsmpio, 27 June 2014).
The ocean as a whole presented a 
roster of tribulations for the FSM, but 
a particularly vexing one was sustain-
able fisheries. On the one hand, the 
FSM continued to reap the economic 
benefits of issuing fishing licenses to 
foreign fishing operators hunting the 
tuna stocks in FSM waters, par-
ticularly bigeye and skipjack. Indeed, 
according to the scientific committee 
of the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (an intergov-
ernmental organization that regulates 
the world’s largest tuna fishery in the 
western and central Pacific Ocean), 
the value of the tuna fishery in the 
western Pacific exceeded $4 billion 
in 2012, with Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement (including the FSM) real-
izing nearly $250 million in fish-
ing revenue in 2013, a 400 percent 
increase from only three years earlier 
(mv, 22 Aug 2013). National fisher-
ies, after being the butt of jokes in the 
federation for nearly the entirety of 
the country’s existence, have become 
a lucrative industry, arguably the most 
successful sector of the FSM economy. 
On the other hand, the FSM govern-
ment continued to grapple with iuu 
fishing in its waters. Foreign fishing 
vessels regularly snared unwanted 
maritime life as bycatch in their nets 
and discarded them rather than bring 
them to shore. Vessels also routinely 
fished in FSM waters without prior 
licensing or beyond prescribed quotas 
imposed by the FSM government. A 
recent study estimated that iuu fishing 
in the western and central Pacific pro-
duces economic losses of up to $1.5 
billion a year (Pew 2013). Just as the 
FSM national economy—long belea-
guered and hamstrung by dependency 
on financial infusions from the United 
States—was finally enjoying a mea-
sure of self-sufficiency, external forces 
threatened to derail it.
In an effort to highlight its struggles 
with iuu fishing, on 27 November 
2013, the FSM government submitted 
a written statement to the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
in Case 21 (itlos 2013). The case 
involves a request for an advisory 
opinion submitted to the tribunal by 
the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commis-
sion, whose membership comprises 
a number of West African states. 
The requested advisory opinion will 
address the rights and obligations 
of coastal states and flag states with 
regard to iuu fishing and the sus-
tainable management of certain fish 
stocks, particularly small pelagic spe-
cies and tuna. In its written statement, 
the FSM government asserted, among 
other things, that flag states have a 
due-diligence obligation under inter-
national law to ensure that its flagged 
vessels do not engage in iuu fishing 
activities in the high seas and in the 
national waters of third-party coastal 
states. The statement also places the 
same obligation on international 
agencies like the European Commis-
sion, which concludes and administers 
fishing arrangements for its members 
with the FSM and other Pacific states. 
Although the advisory opinion, when 
issued, will not constitute a binding 
legal judgment, it will hopefully iden-
tify and present existing international 
law principles regarding the steps that 
states must take to eliminate iuu fish-
ing—particularly when committed by 
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vessels flagged by those states—and 
properly manage the world’s dwin-
dling fish stocks.
In contrast to its difficulties 
addressing iuu fishing, the FSM took 
historic steps in another arena of 
ocean health: the establishment of a 
national sanctuary for sharks. Spear-
headed by several local environmental 
nongovernmental organizations—
notably the Conservation Society of 
Pohnpei—and the Pew Charitable 
Trusts, the sanctuary effort aimed 
to prohibit the commercial fishing 
of sharks anywhere in the FSM’s 
200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone, a swath stretching across 2.5 
million square miles. According to the 
Pew Foundation, each live shark is 
worth millions of dollars in revenue 
for the FSM, primarily through shark 
tourism. Environmental groups were 
also concerned about practices by fish-
ing vessels, particularly Asian opera-
tors, catching sharks in the western 
Pacific, removing their fins, and dis-
carding them to their certain deaths.
Before the FSM national govern-
ment could establish a national shark 
sanctuary, however, each of the FSM’s 
four states had to adopt legislation 
establishing similar sanctuaries in their 
twelve-mile territorial seas (within 
which the FSM national government 
has limited constitutional authority 
with regard to regulating marine life). 
Kosrae established its shark sanctuary 
in September 2012, while Pohnpei and 
Yap established their own sanctuaries 
in June 2013. On 1 May 2014, Chuuk 
became the fourth and final FSM state 
to do so (Pew 2014). The FSM Con-
gress will now consider legislation for 
a national shark sanctuary, the final 
leg in a long process.
The coordination between the FSM 
national government and the four 
states of the federation in the shark 
sanctuary project was notable for its 
novelty. Indeed, in the period covered 
by this review, relations between the 
FSM national government and the 
states were frequently tense. While the 
FSM national government joined its 
like-minded allies in solidarity on the 
international stage to combat climate 
change, restore ocean health, and 
conserve and manage the ocean’s life 
and resources, it struggled at times 
to maintain equally cordial relations 
with its constituent states. The long-
running debate on tax reform and 
a time-sensitive push to liberalize 
telecommunications in the federation 
exemplified that struggle. The Mori 
administration identified both issues 
as crucial for the FSM’s economic for-
tunes and lobbied hard to implement 
them, but the administration ran into 
pronounced resistance from the states 
as well as from the FSM Congress—a 
persistent theme of domestic politics 
during the year in review.
Beginning in 2005, the Mori 
administration attempted to imple-
ment a national value added tax (vat) 
regime in the FSM, citing favorable 
tax-revenue projections compared to 
the current national gross receipts tax 
regime. On 19 April 2011 and 1 May 
2012, President Mori signed into law 
the Unified Revenue Authority Act 
and the Revenue Administration Act, 
respectively. The two acts established 
a Unified Revenue Authority and 
prescribed the means by which the 
authority would collect value added 
taxes in each state under the new 
regime. At the insistence of several 
members of the FSM Congress, the 
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Revenue Administration Act contained 
a so-called “sunset clause,” which 
stipulated that the act—and, thus, the 
entire vat regime—would become 
null and void if any of the four states 
of the federation had not passed 
complementary vat legislation at the 
state level by 19 April 2013. Chuuk 
and Kosrae signaled their support of 
the new regime from the beginning, 
but Pohnpei and Yap withheld their 
approval. The Yap State Legislature 
in particular insisted that its state 
constitution prohibited any entity 
other than the Yap State Government 
and local municipal governments 
from collecting any taxes in Yap, even 
national taxes. The collection of value 
added taxes by the Unified Revenue 
Authority in Yap would thus conflict 
with Yap’s constitutional imperative 
(fsmpio, 8 July 2013).
Because of resistance from Yap and 
Pohnpei, the FSM Congress amended 
the Revenue Administration Act three 
times between April 2013 and March 
2014 in order to give both states 
enough time to reconsider their posi-
tions and adopt complementary vat 
legislation. A Tax Reform Task Force 
established by the Mori administration 
aggressively lobbied Yap and Pohnpei 
(fsmis, 29 March 2014). President 
Mori wrote to the leadership of Yap, 
beseeching the state to see “if there 
is any way Yap State can reconsider 
its position on the tax reform and 
figure out a way to join in the FSM 
tax reform efforts” (fsmis, 23 Oct 
2013). As the Yap State Legislature 
dug in its heels and continued insisting 
on its interpretation of the Yap State 
Constitution, tensions flared with 
the task force, which argued that the 
legislature’s interpretation of the state 
constitution was deeply flawed. At a 
certain point, the Yap State Legisla-
ture proposed that the new tax regime 
allow the Yap State Government to 
collect the new taxes on behalf of, 
and forward the taxes to, the national 
government, so as to avoid violating 
the Yap State Constitution. The Mori 
administration balked, insisting that 
the United Revenue Authority conduct 
all tax collection. Whether the Mori 
administration distrusted Yap with 
the tax collection was never publicly 
acknowledged, but that was certainly 
the impression that was created.
The last extension of the sunset 
clause was set to end on 31 May 
2014. Given the opportunity at the 
end of its Fourth Regular Session to 
extend the sunset clause again and 
allow Yap and Pohnpei more time to 
reconsider their stances, the FSM Con-
gress chose not to do so (kp, 11 June 
2014). Congress could have amended 
the Revenue Administration Act to 
eliminate the sunset clause altogether, 
but members of Congress insisted that 
all the states had to participate in the 
new tax regime or else it would not 
proceed. After years of bruising battles 
between the Mori administration and 
two states in the federation, the tax-
reform effort came to an ignominious 
end.
While the national government 
grappled with states in the tax reform 
debate, tensions also erupted between 
the Mori administration and the FSM 
Congress on the issue of telecommu-
nications liberalization. By law, the 
FSM Telecommunications Corpora-
tion (fsmtc) was the sole provider 
of telecommunications services in the 
federation, as a public corporation 
exercising a virtual monopoly. For 
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years, elements in the FSM, particu-
larly the private sector, clamored for 
a liberalization of the federation’s 
telecommunications services by way 
of repealing or amending the enabling 
legislation for fsmtc, but they ran 
into resistance from the FSM Con-
gress. However, during the Microne-
sian Presidential Summit in July 2013, 
the World Bank entered the fray with 
an enticing proposal: in return for 
liberalizing its telecommunications 
sector, the FSM government would 
receive a $40 million grant from the 
World Bank to implement a submarine 
fiber-optic-cable system for the federa-
tion, including $27 million to connect 
Yap via a spur to a planned subma-
rine fiber-optic cable between Palau 
and Guam. The World Bank placed 
a strict deadline on its proposal: if 
the FSM government did not liberal-
ize telecommunications and create an 
independent regulatory entity for the 
newly liberalized telecommunications 
industry by February 2014, the World 
Bank would withdraw its grant offer 
(fsmis, 1 Oct 2013). As Pohnpei is the 
only state in the federation that has 
fiber-optic connectivity, interest in the 
World Bank offer was quite high.
In response to the World Bank 
proposal, the Mori administration 
submitted a lengthy bill to Congress in 
September 2013 that called for remov-
ing fsmtc’s monopoly over telecom-
munications in the federation and 
establishing a new independent entity 
called the Office of the Telecommuni-
cation Regulation Authority (fsmc, 
cb 18-77). The Mori administration 
had pursued fiber-optic connectivity 
for all four states of the federation 
since its first term, but the effort had 
faltered because of a lack of fund-
ing. The administration seized on the 
World Bank offer to realize its long-
standing policy goal. The ball was in 
Congress’s court.
While Congress reviewed the volu-
minous bill, the Yap State leadership 
met with Yap’s senators, Isaac Figir 
and Joseph Urusemal, on 19 August 
2013 and unanimously endorsed the 
telecommunications liberalization 
bill pending before Congress. Yap 
State Legislature Speaker Henry Falan 
called the World Bank offer a “golden 
opportunity of a lifetime that may 
never come again” and joined the rest 
of the Yap State leadership in endors-
ing the World Bank offer (ynb, 22 
Aug 2013).
Despite the strong push from the 
Mori administration, the unanimous 
endorsement from the Yap State 
leadership, growing public support 
from the general public (particularly in 
Yap), and the February 2014 deadline 
imposed by the World Bank, the FSM 
Congress took its time reviewing the 
liberalization bill. Senator Isaac Figir, 
chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee, echoed the sentiments of 
some members of Congress when he 
warned in October 2013 that “there’s 
no such thing as a free lunch. Every-
thing comes at a price” (kp, 3 Oct 
2013). Pohnpei Senator Peter Chris-
tian, chairman of the Transportation 
and Communications Committee, 
noted that “we will do it but we’ll do 
it our own way” (kp,16 Oct 2013). 
The fsmtc opposed the bill in part 
because it called for restructuring the 
fsmtc’s governance structure.
After seven months of extensive 
review, the FSM Congress passed a 
modified version of the telecommuni-
cations liberalization bill submitted by 
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the Mori administration. The modified 
version refrained from interfering with 
the fsmtc’s governance structure, a 
move that secured the fsmtc’s sup-
port for the bill. President Mori signed 
the bill into law as the FSM Telecom-
munications Act of 2014 on 3 April 
2014 (fsmc, pl 18-52). The Mori 
administration called the signing a 
“big moment” in the country’s history 
(fsmis, 4 April 2014).
However, the FSM Congress was 
less-than-enthused about the process. 
The Committee on Transportation 
and Communications, although it 
ultimately recommended passage of 
the liberalization bill, groused that the 
Mori administration had been discuss-
ing the liberalization process and the 
attendant grant offer with the World 
Bank for three years but did not bring 
the matter to the attention of the FSM 
Congress until September 2013 (kp, 3 
April 2014).
The sour reaction of the FSM Con-
gress soon bloomed into acrimony. 
During its Fourth Regular Session in 
May 2014, Congress was informed 
that the World Bank would no lon-
ger provide the $40 million grant for 
fiber-optic connectivity but would 
instead direct the grant funding to 
renewable energy projects in the fed-
eration. The reason for the change was 
that the FSM government had enacted 
its telecommunications liberalization 
law after the World Bank’s deadline of 
February 2014. To add insult to injury, 
the Mori administration revealed to 
Congress that the plan to use the grant 
funding for renewable energy projects 
had been known to the Mori admin-
istration ahead of time as a “Plan B” 
in case the liberalization bill was not 
enacted in time. Speaker and Pohnpei 
Senator Dohsis Halbert, in a statement 
on the floor of Congress, essentially 
accused the Mori administration of 
hoodwinking Congress by insist-
ing that “it was fiber optic or bust,” 
without mentioning to Congress the 
renewable energy alternative. Hal-
bert questioned the administration’s 
credibility, wondering whether its line 
was “a lie, a deliberate deception, or a 
farcical show of incompetence” (cis, 
17 May 2014).
In what appeared to be a measure 
of retaliation, the FSM Congress 
passed legislation on 28 May 2014 
that amended the FSM Telecommu-
nications Act in order to delay until 
12 May 2015 the implementation of 
the chapter in the act that establishes 
the Office of the Telecommunica-
tions Regulation Authority (fsmc, cb 
18-164). President Mori subsequently 
vetoed the legislation. In his veto 
transmittal letter to Congress, Presi-
dent Mori criticized the lack of any 
public hearings or committee reports 
on the legislation before its passage by 
Congress and noted that the legisla-
tion, if it became law, would hinder 
the FSM’s ability to seek grant funding 
from the World Bank for fiber-optic 
connectivity during the bank’s next 
round of financing (fsmis, 26 June 
2014). In other words, although the 
FSM missed out on qualifying for 
the World Bank’s original grant offer 
because the FSM Congress had failed 
to pass the Telecommunications Act 
before the bank’s February 2014 dead-
line, the government could still qualify 
for a new grant offer in the near 
future, especially after implementing 
its Telecommunications Act. As of 
press time, the FSM Congress had not 
acted on President Mori’s veto.
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The tussle between the Mori admin-
istration and Congress on the tele-
communications liberalization issue 
was emblematic of deeper tensions 
between the two branches. During 
the year in review, President Mori 
vetoed eight bills passed by Congress. 
A majority of those bills involved 
appropriations of government funds. 
In response, Congress overrode five of 
President Mori’s vetoes, including a 
line-item veto on a bill appropriating 
nearly $5 million for “public projects 
and social programs” in the states of 
the federation—in other words, pork-
barrel projects—that President Mori 
criticized as having been approved by 
Congress without transparency, suf-
ficient specificity about implementa-
tion, and proper consideration for the 
federation’s fundamental fiscal needs 
(fsmis, 14 Jan 2014).
In an attempt to clear the air about 
the appropriations process, the Mori 
administration and members of Con-
gress met twice in late January 2014 
in closed-door sessions. During the 
meetings, President Mori asked Con-
gress to consult more often with con-
stituents about public projects before 
appropriating funds for them; provide 
enough details about those projects in 
order for the president, as allottee, to 
disburse the appropriated funds in a 
transparent manner; and refrain from 
getting involved with how the funds 
should be spent after they are appro-
priated (which the president argued 
would be a violation of the constitu-
tional separation of powers between 
Congress and the executive branch) 
(kp, 19 Feb 2014). President Mori sub-
sequently submitted a memorandum 
of understanding to Speaker Halbert 
containing his requests and asked the 
Speaker to encourage Congress to 
sign and abide by the memorandum. 
Speaker Halbert tersely responded 
that he had no authority to compel 
the other members of Congress to sign 
the memorandum and that Congress 
would discuss the memorandum at a 
later date (kp, 6 Feb 2014).
The bitterness between Congress 
and the Mori administration over 
fiscal matters played out against 
the backdrop of growing domestic 
concerns about the end of financial 
assistance under the Compact of Free 
 Association in 2023. Indeed, part of 
the Mori administration’s frustration 
with Congress was the latter’s insis-
tence on appropriating government 
funds for public projects in lieu of 
contributing to a Set Aside Fund that 
President Mori called for establishing 
in a bill he transmitted to Congress 
on 14 August 2013 (fmsis, 19 Aug 
2013). The Set Aside Fund, if imple-
mented, would require the appropria-
tion of at least $5 million annually 
into a restricted fund that would swell 
to at least $50 million by 2023, and 
that would not be tapped beforehand 
except for limited projects selected 
after a very diligent review by the 
executive branch and approval from 
Congress. The fund would “finance 
viable investment projects that will 
accelerate economic growth” and 
“prepare for and mitigate the budget-
ary shortfall expected in 2023 arising 
from the termination of Compact 
financial assistance.” Congress, at 
press time, had not passed the presi-
dent’s bill. However, Congress did 
pass a bill—which subsequently 
became law on 6 May 2014—that 
reduced the national government’s 
share of compact funds from 5 percent 
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to 0 percent and redistributed the 
entirety of the reduction to the four 
states in the federation (fsmc, pl 
18-57).
Augmenting compact-related stress, 
the Joint Economic Management 
Committee (jemco) responsible for 
approving compact sector grants for 
the Federated States of Micronesia 
rejected the FSM’s requests to use 
approximately $8 million of compact 
grants for various sectoral projects in 
fiscal year 2013 (except for about $2.5 
million for the College of Micronesia), 
leaving a nearly $6 million shortfall 
in the FSM budget (kp, 4 Sept 2013). 
jemco’s decision on 22 August 2013 
prompted President Mori to tell US 
Interior Secretary Sally Jewell in a 
6 September 2013 meeting that the 
FSM resented the committee’s “micro-
management attitude” (fsmis, 30 Sept 
2013).
Realizing the growing difficulty 
of relying on the United States to be 
sensitive to the FSM’s fiscal needs, the 
Mori administration pressed ahead 
with the work of the 2023 Planning 
Committee, which was established by 
the administration to consult widely 
in the federation about strategies for 
securing the FSM’s long-term fiscal 
stability and economic growth beyond 
the termination of compact financial 
assistance in 2023. The committee, 
led by President Mori and includ-
ing the governors of the four states, 
met 7–8 December 2013 and again 
in May 2014, with several rounds 
of consultations in the interim with 
government officials and private sector 
representatives in all four states of the 
federation. The committee is expected 
to produce an action plan by October 
2014 recommending strategies for the 
post-2023 period (fsmpio, 1 May 
2014). Quite tellingly, the committee 
does not include members of Con-
gress, even though there is no legal 
prohibition against such inclusion.
Fiscal responsibility and economic 
planning dominated President Mori’s 
final State of the Nation address, 
which he delivered before the FSM 
Congress on 29 May 2014. Noting his 
administration’s economic, fiscal, and 
policy achievements, President Mori 
nevertheless warned that “the winds 
of change are blowing our way” in a 
world grappling with climate change, 
threats to the Ocean and its resources, 
and geopolitical crises. President Mori 
devoted his “parting words” to a typi-
cally business-minded exhortation, as 
befitting the former banker: that “we 
renew our efforts and work together 
to allocate our limited financial 
resources to the priority needs of this 
nation” (fsmis, 28 May 2014).
Possibly lost amid the sections on 
long-term financial planning in the 
address was a rather telling proposal: 
a call for a new constitutional conven-
tion that would, among other things, 
propose a constitutional amend-
ment to allow for the direct elec-
tions of the FSM president and vice 
president, as opposed to the current 
system whereby the members of the 
FSM Congress select the federation’s 
president and vice president from 
among the members holding four-year 
seats (fsmis, 29 May 2014). Couched 
in language expressing concern over 
how “bloated bureaucracy at all levels 
of government” had hampered the 
nation’s economic growth and calling 
for “more constructive engagement 
between all branches of government,” 
the proposal for direct elections of 
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the highest offices of the land was, 
at the very least, a parting shot from 
President Mori to Congress, a body 
that had frequently bedeviled his 
administration. Even as President 
Mori announced to the international 
community the nation’s commitment 
to tackling the pressing crises of the 
day, he signaled his administration’s 
keen awareness of the difficulty of 
achieving—let alone maintaining—
governmental unity domestically. To 
the very end, it seemed, the leitmotif 
would hold true: solidarity outside, 
dissension within.
clement yow mulalap
The opinions expressed in this 
review are those of the author and do 
not necessarily reflect the official views 
of the government of the  Federated 
States of Micronesia.
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Guam 
Three out of the seventeen remain-
ing entities (20%) recognized by the 
United Nations as non-self-governing 
are unincorporated territories within 
the US political system (UN 2014). 
Two of these are in the Pacific: Ameri-
can Sāmoa and Guåhan (Guam). Even 
mainstream media recognized Guam’s 
colonial condition in 2014 in a tourist-
focused cnn story dubbing the island 
a “colonial holdout” (Ćrossan 2014), 
despite 115 years under the rule of 
a nation often called “the Greatest 
Democracy on Earth.”
Guam decolonization efforts can be 
viewed as occurring in three overlap-
ping sets of activities to decolonize 
both the mindset and the political sta-
tus of its peoples. Each had a sizable 
presence this last year—local empow-
erment through cultural strengthening 
and reconnecting the community to 
traditional practices and worldviews, 
advocacy, and local government 
actions. 
Numerous efforts across virtu-
ally all sectors of Guam’s community 
continued to strengthen indigenous 
Cha morro culture and local identity, 
including e-books documenting Cha-
morro family clan names; the revival 
of the ancestral procession to the 
Chamorro “creation point”; the devel-
opment of a television show called 
Nihi! for Guam’s nenes (children); the 
first-ever offering of Chamorro dance 
classes at the University of Guam 
(uog); numerous locally produced 
films about island issues; and digi-
tal interactive applications bringing 
Guam’s traditional oral narratives to 
life. The horizons of cultural programs 
were also broadened by strengthen-
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ing ties to Chamorros living in other 
US areas and showcasing Chamorro 
culture internationally, the latter 
evidenced by Inetnon Gefpåa'go’s 
 cultural arts program tour of Europe 
in 2014. The new uog Chamorro 
Studies program was highlighted in 
October 2013 when the governor of 
Guam signed a proclamation declaring 
it “I Sakkan I Inestudian Chamorro” 
(The Year of Chamorro Studies) (pnc, 
15 Oct 2013). The program’s first 
year was extremely active with its 
coordinator, Dr Michael Bevacqua, 
traveling off-island in early 2014 to 
visit Chamorros located elsewhere. 
One of the trip’s successes was to sign 
up hundreds of people in support of 
an online Chamorro Studies certificate 
program. Also ongoing was con-
struction of the new Guam Museum, 
with a projected completion date of 
December 2014. 
Other cultural endeavors reached 
noteworthy milestones, demonstrat-
ing community interest and viability. 
Examples of this were the 6th Annual 
Gupot Fanha'aniyan Pulan CHamoru: 
Chamorro Lunar Calendar Festival; 
the 10th annual Chamorro dance com-
petition, Dinanna Pa'a  Taotao Tano'; 
the 2nd Marianas  History Conference; 
and the conferring of another Honor-
ary Master of Micronesian Traditional 
Knowledge degree on indigenous 
musician Candido Babauta Taman. 
Guampedia, Guam’s online 
resource since 2008, completed its 
website restructuring with a new 
comprehensive section, “Chamorro 
Quest for Self-Determination,” that 
details the self-determination efforts 
of the people of Guam. Guampedia 
also embarked on new initiatives to 
capture and share voices of island 
elders as well as involve island youth 
in documenting Guam’s history and 
issues, the latter to be launched in 
August 2014 with a student film 
on self-determination (Rita Nauta, 
Managing Director, Guampedia, pers 
comm, 11 July 2014).
On the research front, Guam 
benefitted from the efforts of cul-
tural groups and academics work-
ing together, such as I Fanlalai'an 
(Cha morro chant group) and Dr 
Carlos Madrid. They examined an 
item from 1798, believed to be the 
first official government document 
written in Chamorro and featur-
ing archaic Chamorro words (pnc, 
27 March 2014). New understand-
ings about Chamorro settlement and 
subsequent migrations came to light 
from a National Geographic Geno-
graphic Project and an effort by local 
researcher Jillette Leon-Guerrero. The 
former validated and fine-tuned earlier 
theories about Chamorro origins, 
while the latter traced the ancestry of 
a family from Hawai‘i to Guam (pdn, 
14 Oct 2013; Across the Water in 
Time 2013).
Preparations for hosting the Festi-
val of Pacific Arts in 2016 continued 
during the year under review.  During 
workshops and meetings, Guam com-
munity members noted the growth 
in island cultural revitalization since 
Guam’s first participation in the Festi-
val in 1972 (Guampedia 2014).
While the Commission on Decolo-
nization was relaunched in 2011 after 
several years of inactivity, it contin-
ued to lack an operating budget for 
fiscal years 2013 and 2014. However, 
Executive Director Edward Alvarez, 
commission members, and political 
status task force chairs found creative 
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ways to move decolonization forward 
(Alvarez, pers comm, 14 July 2014). 
The executive director has focused on 
two main activities for the commis-
sion. One has been raising awareness 
by talking to island youth as well as 
rotary clubs and civic organizations. 
The purpose of much of this has 
been to provide people with accurate 
information, to correct misconcep-
tions, and to help people envision the 
possibilities of a decolonized future. 
Current misconceptions and fears 
range from thinking that Guam is 
already sovereign as part of the United 
States to assuming that the island can-
not “make it” economically under a 
different political status (Alvarez, pers 
comm, 14 July 2014). The commis-
sion’s second focus has been standard-
izing and rewriting position papers 
on the three political status options 
recognized by the United Nations as 
ways of exercising a full measure of 
self-government: independence, free 
association with an independent state, 
and full integration with an indepen-
dent state. Both of the commission’s 
efforts are ongoing, with some task 
forces, such as that for independence, 
also active at the grassroots level 
 (Bevacqua, pers comm, 18 July 2014).
The commission has continued 
to look for funding from the local 
government, through various types 
of support from the community, and 
through grants (Alvarez, pers comm, 
14 July 2014). The commission is 
helping Southern Christian Academy 
to prepare for an upcoming forensic 
debate for island high school students 
wherein teams will deliberate Guam’s 
three decolonization political status 
options (Bevacqua, pers comm, 18 
July 2014).
Further, Guam has been working 
across boundaries within the region 
and among other territories including 
those of the United States to further 
the decolonization cause. The commis-
sion’s executive director gave inter-
views to Radio Australia and to news 
programs in Japan in 2013 and pro-
vided presentations to Japanese high 
school and university students, among 
other networking activities (Alvarez, 
pers comm, 14 July 2014).
However, some have noted that real 
awareness, education, and progress 
toward self-determination suffer from 
the government’s lack of prioritiza-
tion as well as inadequate funding. 
As such, a heavier burden has been 
borne by advocacy groups within 
the period under review, including 
the Guåhan Coalition for Peace and 
Justice, Nasion CHamoru, Our Islands 
Are Sacred, We Are Guåhan, and 
others that have worked to empower, 
educate, and mobilize indigenous 
Cha morros and others of Guam. It 
was these groups, for example, that 
provided the only non-federal govern-
ment forum to present findings to the 
general public concerning the 2014 
Draft Supplemental Environmental 
Impact Statement (Draft seis) con-
cerning “Guam and CNMI Military 
Relocation; Relocating Marines from 
Okinawa, Japan to Guam,” for which 
community input was being sought 
(pnc, 27 June 2014).
Another effort addressing the 
political rights of the people of Guam 
during the period under review was 
the “We The People Project” founded 
by former resident and civil rights 
attorney Neil Weare. By mid-2014, 
the project’s Right to Vote Survey 
circulated among Guam residents as a 
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means to “help us make the case that 
the right to vote [for US president] 
shouldn’t depend on where you live.” 
While some question the appropriate-
ness of addressing political status–
related issues piecemeal because of 
possible impacts on Guam’s self-deter-
mination process, Weare and attorney 
Leevin Camacho see value in tackling 
issues through “impact litigation to 
drive broader political and social 
change” (Marianas Business Journal 
12 (5): 1 [14 July–27 July 2014]).
The year under review posed heavy 
demands on the community to provide 
input regarding  expanded militariza-
tion in Guam. Two of these demands 
were the public meeting that was 
held in November 2013 regarding 
the 1,760-page, two-volume Mariana 
Islands Training and Testing Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement/
Overseas Environmental Impact 
Statement and the three public forums 
concerning the 1,448-page Draft 
seis in May 2014. Guam’s commu-
nity does want and should have the 
opportunity for comment. However, 
some have expressed the views that a 
community of approximately 170,000 
people can only consider so much in 
a year’s period of time while having 
to meet many other pressing commu-
nity demands and that the comment 
periods were extremely short for the 
consideration of such lengthy and 
complex proposals written by teams 
of specialists (a sixty-day comment 
period is not uncommon). Moreover, 
public forums have long been noted 
as culturally inappropriate ways to 
gather real community input from 
indigenous Oceanic societies. 
Some of the key differences that 
were noted between the Final eis 
of 2010 and the Draft seis of 2014 
included decreasing the number of 
marines and dependents to be relo-
cated to Guam; spreading out the 
intensity of construction over several 
more years; decreasing the amount 
of locally held land acquired (note, 
however, that this did not mean that 
federally administered land will not 
be requested to shift from being held 
in trust for the community of Guam); 
fewer infrastructural demands; and 
the addition of alternative sites to 
consider for proposed activities 
(Draft seis 2014, es-3). While some 
in the community have pointed to 
the hundreds of millions of dollars 
being spent on the buildup and have 
predicted economic growth for the 
island, others have noted that Guam’s 
educational, social, and health services 
and infrastructure are already stressed 
in meeting current demands and that 
any increase would be too much. 
They remind the community that the 
Government of Guam (GovGuam) 
will be largely financially responsible 
for the costly increase in services and 
improved infrastructure; that buildup 
contracts will largely be awarded to 
non-local companies; and that, accord-
ing to the Draft seis itself, economic 
growth will be minimal. A major point 
of controversy has been the shift in 
the preferred location for the Live-
Fire Training Range Complex from a 
site that impacted the i manmofo'na 
(ancestral) village of Pågat (which has 
not been eliminated as an alternative) 
to one that impacts an i manmofo'na 
village at Litekyan (Ritidian), which 
has innumerable sacred sites and 
is also an area that has been desig-
nated by the US federal government 
as a  crucial component of the Guam 
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National Wildlife Refuge, the island’s 
only critical-habitat recovery area.
Added to these difficulties have 
been assertions that the local govern-
ment has placed gag orders on govern-
ment offices from speaking out against 
the buildup; that professionals are 
reticent to get involved in matters on 
which their jobs or consultancies rely; 
and that people may be reluctant to 
take a stand that may or may not be 
in line with the wishes of the island’s 
indigenous community. Further, some 
have noted the striking coincidence 
that at the same time that opposi-
tion to increased militarization in the 
Marianas has developed a strong uog 
faculty and student component, both 
the original deadline and the extended 
deadline for the latest of the public 
comments fell during their finals 
weeks. 
Much discussed within many circles 
on Guam has been the challenge of 
being indigenous in one’s homeland 
and dealing with people holding dif-
fering cultural values and worldviews 
about issues such as the significance 
of ancestral lands and pristine island 
environments. These differences are 
often in evidence whether the person 
be one of the high number of non-
indigenous, and at times quite vocal, 
Guam community members or a repre-
sentative of the US military. From the 
indigenous perspective, islands consti-
tute an irreplaceable heritage handed 
down over hundreds or thousands 
of years, while others may see them 
as commodities and places for recre-
ational activities. Thousands of acres 
of sacred or otherwise highly valued 
ancestral areas are in danger of being 
taken, destroyed, forever altered, or 
otherwise made inaccessible.
Some have pointed out contradic-
tions in federal government assess-
ments for the Mariana Islands and 
its neighbors. US military plans to 
increase their usage of and impact 
on resources in the Mariana Islands 
are directly at odds with the designa-
tion of the Guam National Wildlife 
Refuge decades ago, the Marianas 
Trench Marine National Monument 
in 2009, and the expressed interest by 
the US federal government in vastly 
increasing the size of a Pacific Ocean’s 
marine sanctuary because “the United 
States is leading the fight to protect 
our oceans” (Eilperin 2014). 
August saw a fierce battle between 
the Democratic Party–controlled 
legislature and Republican Governor 
Edward J “Eddie” Baza Calvo, who 
opposed Democratic initiatives to 
restore supplemental annuities, imple-
ment pay adjustments for govern-
ment employees, and provide a larger 
reserve for income tax refunds than 
recommended by the Calvo admin-
istration (pdn, 21 Aug 2013; mv, 29 
Aug 2013). After several attempts, a 
compromise version was unanimously 
adopted that funded Hay Study pay 
raises for GovGuam employees; 
restored cost of living allowances for 
GovGuam retirees to the level they 
were at a decade ago; and provided 
$7 million more than the governor 
proposed to be held in reserve for the 
payment of tax refunds (pnc, 20 Aug 
2013).
The issue of tax refunds was a 
source of conflict between the Calvo 
administration and the legislature as 
senators criticized the governor for 
using $50 million in tax refund money 
for operations and effectively keeping 
19,000 taxpayers waiting for refunds 
228 the contemporary pacific • 27:1 (2015)
even though the law prohibited him 
from doing so (mv, 12 June 2014). 
Senators sought a declaratory judg-
ment from Governor Calvo on the 
matter, and in June the Guam Supreme 
Court unanimously ruled that it was 
illegal for the governor to use money 
that is reserved for refunds for other 
purposes (pdn, 18 June 2014). While 
losing in the Supreme Court, the Calvo 
administration was fighting another 
court order in federal court that 
would require the governor to pay tax 
refunds within six months. The court 
order had been issued in response to a 
taxpayers’ class-action lawsuit against 
the Government of Guam. The legis-
lature’s appropriations chair, Senator 
Vicente “Ben” Pangelinan, labeled 
the governor’s appeal as “completely 
absurd” and “a complete waste of 
taxpayer money” (pnc, 3 March 
2013). In June, the administration was 
ordered by the court to post a $2.2 
million bond to cover the attorneys’ 
fees of the taxpayers who filed the 
lawsuit, pending the outcome of the 
appeal (mv, 12 June 2014). There were 
also other concerns regarding Gov-
Guam finances, as the public auditor 
reported in July that long-term debt 
for the Government of Guam had 
increased by 44 percent in fiscal year 
2012 (ap 2013). 
On taking office in 2011, the Calvo 
Administration halted implementation 
of the comprehensive government pay 
adjustment plan known as the Hay 
Study. However, by 2014 Governor 
Calvo was interested in implement-
ing it (kuam, 12 Jan 2011). Acting 
on authority granted in the Budget 
Act for fiscal year 2014, the admin-
istration submitted a plan that not 
only adjusted the pay of classified 
employees but also that of elected 
officials such as the governor, lieuten-
ant governor, senators, and mayors, 
as well as unclassified employees, 
including the governor’s office staff 
and agency directors. Democratic 
senators conveyed their opposition to 
pay raises for the governor, lieuten-
ant governor, senators, and political 
appointees in the executive branch 
(pnc, 21 Jan 2014). Eventually the 
administration’s Hay Plan took effect, 
but senators later passed legislation 
eliminating the raises for the governor, 
lieutenant  governor, senators, cabinet 
directors, and other political appoin-
tees (pnc, 3 Feb 2014). For those 
workers affected by the Hay Study, 
there was considerable disappointment 
in its implementation, as in the case 
of a number of public school educa-
tors who had served for twenty years 
yet received as little as 46 cents more 
in their biweekly paycheck (pnc, 19 
Feb 2014). Almost a quarter of the 
Department of Education’s employees 
filed grievances challenging the plan 
(pdn, 14 May 2014).
Another issue tackled by Guam 
 legislators was a bill introduced by 
Vice Speaker Benjamin JF “BJ” Cruz 
to raise the minimum wage. After 
strong opposition from the Guam 
Chamber of Commerce, Cruz’s bill 
was amended, passed unanimously, 
and signed into law by Governor 
Calvo. Originally proposed to incre-
mentally increase the minimum wage 
to $10.10 an hour by 2017, the 
measure was reduced to a single dollar 
increase, from $7.25 to $8.25 an hour 
effective 1 January 2015. Seventeen 
percent of private-sector workers and 
14 percent of Guam’s total labor force 
earn less than $8.20 an hour, accord-
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ing to data from the Guam Bureau 
of Labor and Statistics. An estimated 
7,000 workers will be affected by the 
increase (pnc, 12 July 2014).
As the 2014 elections approached, 
the community was transfixed by 
developments in the Democratic 
Party as many wondered whether the 
party would put forth an opponent 
to incumbent Republican Governor 
Eddie Calvo (pnc, 11 April 2014). In 
November 2013, the Democrats held 
their elections for party officers, select-
ing the Legislature’s Majority Leader 
Senator Rory Respicio as chairman 
and former Department of Education 
Superintendent Dr Nerissa Bretania 
Underwood as vice chair (kuam, 5 
Nov 2014). Also elected were John 
Paul Manuel as secretary, Coy Tor-
res as treasurer, and members of the 
 Central Executive Committee, repre-
senting the island’s villages. Democrats 
were encouraged when the turnout for 
the party election was triple that of the 
previous one. Senator Respicio and 
Bretania Underwood set as their goals 
to strengthen the Democratic Party 
over the next six months and to help 
launch a strong gubernatorial team 
“to take on the current administra-
tion” (mv, 11 Nov 2013).
In April, to foster discussion about 
the party’s future and potential 
Democratic candidates for gover-
nor and other offices, party officers 
embarked on a “listening tour” of 
the island’s villages. The tour began 
in Agat and was deemed a success by 
Democratic leaders as residents voiced 
their concerns about crime, the state 
of education, and the need to provide 
an alternative to the Calvo administra-
tion (Saipan Tribune, 26 April 2014). 
Respicio noted that the party was 
succeeding in uniting all factions and 
surmounting past problems of faction-
alism (pnc, 10 April 2014).
By June, the pace of meetings of 
Democratic leaders stepped up, and, at 
Democrats’ urging, former Governor 
Carl TC Gutierrez and attorney Gary 
Gumataotao announced they were 
running for governor and lieuten-
ant governor, respectively (pnc, 23 
June 2014). The day before the filing 
deadline, the Gutierrez-Gumataotao 
team filed for the Democratic primary, 
to be held 30 August 2014, setting 
the stage for a November contest with 
the Calvo/Tenorio team. On that 
same day, incumbent US Congress-
woman Madeleine Z Bordallo also 
filed her election papers. She will face 
challenger and first-time candidate 
 Matthew “Matt” P Artero in the 
Democratic primary, and the winner 
of that contest will be pitted against 
Margaret McDonald Glover Metcalfe, 
who was the sole candidate for the 
Republican nomination for that post.
Two days before the filing deadline, 
incumbent Senator Vicente “Ben” 
C Pangelinan surprised many when he 
announced that he would not be seek-
ing reelection (kuam, 29 June 2014). 
Pangelinan had been hospitalized, and 
little more than a week later the for-
mer Speaker and ten-term lawmaker 
passed away from cancer (pdn, 8 July 
2014). In addition to Pangelinan, the 
year saw the passing of former sena-
tors James Underwood, G Ricardo 
Salas, and Leonardo San Nicolas 
Paulino; former Mayor Pedro Iriarte 
Borja (Guam Legislature website); and 
former US Congressman and Marine 
Brigadier General Vicente “Ben” 
T Garrido Blaz. The latter four indi-
viduals were survivors of the Japanese 
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occupation of Guam in World War II 
(See the list of Guam survivors in the 
Asan Bay Overlook Memorial Wall 
of Names, downloadable from the US 
National Park Service website for the 
War in the Pacific National Park [US 
nps 2014].). 
The loss of Pangelinan shook up 
the Democratic slate for the 15-seat 
Guam Legislature, but by the primary 
election filing date, 15 candidates had 
filed. In addition to the 8 Democratic 
incumbent senators, 3 former sena-
tors—Adolpho B Palacios Sr, Judith 
P Guthertz, and Hope Alvarez Cris-
tobal—also filed their candidacies. 
Trying for their first time in elective 
office were Rodney A Cruz Jr, Derick 
Baza Hills, and Frank Taitano Ungacta 
Jr. For the remaining slot, Democratic 
Party Vice Chair Dr Nerissa Bretania 
Underwood was drafted by Demo-
cratic leaders. Underwood, who is 
the wife of former US Congressman 
Robert A Underwood, subsequently 
accepted the draft (gec website).
On the Republican side, a con-
test for the Senatorial slate was set 
in motion as 16 candidates vied 
for the 15 Legislative seats. Along 
with incumbents Vicente Anthony 
“Tony” Ada, Thomas “Tommy” 
A Morrison, Aline A Yamashita, 
Christopher “Chris” M Duenas, 
and Brant T McCreadie were former 
senators James “Jim” V Espaldon 
and Frank F Blas Jr, as well as hope-
fuls Mary Camacho Torres, Glenn A 
Leon Guerrero, Roland Blas, Adonis 
Mendiola, William M Castro, Felix C 
Benavente, Valentino Perez, Michelle 
Hope Taitano, and Carl Gross (known 
as “Romeo Carlos”) vying for their 
party’s nomination in the August pri-
mary (gec website).
For the nonpartisan race for attor-
ney general, retired Judge Elizabeth 
Barrett-Anderson, who is also a for-
mer attorney general and senator, filed 
her candidacy to challenge incumbent 
Leonardo “Lenny” M Rapadas (gec 
website).
One referendum that may be 
placed before voters in the November 
2014 election concerns the issue of 
medical marijuana. The legislature 
had approved a bill sponsored by 
Senator Tina Muña Barnes to place 
legalization of medical marijuana on 
the ballot (pdn, 28 Jan 2014). How-
ever, the Guam Election Commission 
(gec) refused to follow the statute, 
citing a conflict with the Organic Act 
of Guam. The election commission 
contended that lawmakers do not 
have the authority to place bills on a 
ballot but only the authority to pass 
bills into law. To resolve the issue, the 
legislature went to the Guam Supreme 
Court seeking a declaratory judgment. 
The court’s decision was expected in 
August 2014 (pnc, 10 April 2014). 
The year saw a renewed drive by 
Guam lawmakers to enforce a provi-
sion of the Compacts of Free Asso-
ciation with the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall 
Islands (known as Freely Associated 
States or fas). The compacts, while 
allowing for unlimited travel to the 
United States for purposes of employ-
ment and education, also provide for 
the deportation of criminals from 
a US territory back to their native 
countries. According to a 2012 report, 
fas residents incarcerated in the local 
prison increased from 873 in 2010 to 
1,132 in 2012 with a cost of $5.38 
million to the Department of Correc-
tions. Seeking action, Vice Speaker 
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Cruz met with the US Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement’s Enforce-
ment and Removal Operations office 
in San Francisco on this issue (pnc, 14 
Jan 2014). Meanwhile, Foreign Affairs 
Chairman Senator Respicio held a 
roundtable discussion with attorneys 
from the Calvo administration and the 
attorney general’s office seeking a legal 
pathway for local officials to move 
on deporting fas citizens  currently 
held at the Department of Corrections 
(pnc, 15 Oct 2013).
Guam’s delegate to Congress 
Madeleine Bordallo faced difficulties 
on two fronts this year with respect 
to long-standing controversies: land 
issues related to the planned military 
buildup and war reparations for those 
who suffered Guam’s World War II 
Japanese occupation. The US Depart-
ment of Defense is in the process of 
selecting a site for a new live-fire train-
ing range complex (lftrc) and has 
stated that its preferred site is in the 
Ritidian Unit of the Guam National 
Wildlife Refuge. Construction of the 
lftrc would not begin until 2017 at 
the earliest, but Bordallo has said that 
if the range complex is not constructed 
the planned buildup may be in jeop-
ardy. To pave the way for the lftrc, 
Bordallo, at the US Navy’s request, 
introduced a bill to establish a safety 
buffer over a portion of the refuge 
when the ranges are in use and to 
close any part of the refuge for safety 
or national security reasons. However, 
critics in Guam pointed out that Bor-
dallo did not consult with them before 
introducing her measure (pdn, 9 May 
2014). Legislative Speaker Judith 
Won Pat criticized Bordallo primar-
ily because the community was not 
properly informed or consulted about 
the bill. Won Pat also noted that the 
measure preempts and hinders other 
processes designed to provide com-
munity input on the lftrc decision, 
including the ongoing consideration 
of the Draft seis and processes such 
as those required under the National 
Environmental Process Act (mv, 16 
May 2014). Aside from environmental 
impacts, concerns were also raised 
that Bordallo’s bill would foreclose 
any chance of the return of the land 
in Ritidian to its original landowners. 
Despite the criticism, Bordallo’s efforts 
received the full backing of Governor 
Calvo (Governor’s Office website, 
9 May 2014). In May, an amended 
 version of Bordallo’s bill passed the 
US House of Representatives as part 
of a larger defense authorization 
 measure (pnc, 24 May 2014). 
In June, news that the provision for 
Guam’s World War II war reparations 
was stripped from the Senate’s Omni-
bus Territories Act caused consider-
able dissatisfaction in the community 
(pnc, 19 June 2014). Governor 
Calvo spoke for many when he said, 
“The people of Guam should get the 
recognition we deserve as a result of 
the atrocities our families suffered in 
World War II. Unfortunately, there is 
still no resolution for the Chamorros 
who haven’t been compensated for 
their suffering—as other Americans 
have been” (pnc, 20 June 2014). This 
negated the minority view, later stated 
by a vocal non-indigenous journalist, 
that Guam should “give up on war 
reparations,” calling it “a waste of 
time and effort” (pnc, 27 June 2014).
kelly g marsh  
and tyrone j taitano
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Un dångkalo na si Yu'os ma'åse 
(thank you) to Attorney Julian Aguon, 
Edward Alvarez, Michael Bevacqua, 
Rita Nauta, and Maria Pangelinan 
for generously accommodating our 
requests for information in the writ­
ing of this article and to Shannon J 
 Murphy and Julian Aguon for their 
review of an earlier version of it.
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Kiribati
This review focuses on the debate on 
climate change and its implications for 
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awareness and understanding of cli-
mate change. The latter committee has 
been actively involved in regional and 
international climate-change meet-
ings. Currently, the Kiribati Adapta-
tion Programme (kap) is championing 
adaptation strategies on the ground. 
The risks associated with climate 
change have been recognized around 
the world, including impacts on 
water quality, land, and soil, as well 
as increased possibilities of severe 
drought and flooding. In reality, there 
is little Kiribati can do to reduce 
its vulnerability, and actions being 
undertaken so far are described as the 
“no regret” measures—steps that can 
be beneficial even in the absence of 
climate change. The country’s strate-
gies to tackle development challenges 
and climate-change risks are docu-
mented in its development plan for 
2012–2015 (Government of Kiribati 
2012). However, this plan only briefly 
details its climate-change adaptation 
strategies, and most of the presi-
dent’s views about climate change as 
published by the local, regional, and 
international media have little con-
nection to this plan. For example, the 
plan does not mention buying “float-
ing metal islands” or purchasing land 
in Fiji. In relation to the government’s 
newly purchased 6,000 hectares on 
Vanua Levu in Fiji, Tong said in 2013 
that his government had no plans 
to develop it but instead bought the 
land as an investment (Lagan 2013). 
More recently, however, Tong indi-
cated the opposite in a Radio New 
Zealand International interview, when 
he stated, “The Kiribati government 
intends exploring options of com-
mercial, industrial and agricultural 
development of the estate. This could 
policymaking and attitudes in Kiribati. 
It also deals with how the govern-
ment has represented this issue to the 
community and to the outside world 
through the local and international 
media and other channels and the 
impacts of such communications on 
I-Kiribati understanding of the issues. 
The review also looks at disjunc-
tures between what is written in the 
country’s national development plan 
and what has been said by President 
Anote Tong, as well as the disconnects 
between scientific reports about and 
citizens’ knowledge of risks associated 
with climate change and possibilities 
to address it at all levels. As the first 
review of Kiribati to appear in these 
pages in almost two decades, rather 
than being comprehensive, it seeks 
only to highlight and discuss key 
trends and themes that have emerged 
in this debate in hope of suggesting 
useful directions for future reviews. 
Kiribati’s position on climate 
change has always been, and will 
continue to be, centered on the notion 
of “disappearing nations” (Korauaba 
2012). This position is driven by 
scientific findings that low-lying atolls 
such as Kiribati are in danger of sink-
ing due to climate change and sea-level 
rise. Most of the land in Kiribati is 
currently only two to three meters 
above sea level. The “sinking feeling” 
is evidenced in impacts that people are 
already experiencing and is supported 
by growing consensus among world 
leaders and scientists. In response to 
these threats, in 2012 the Kiribati 
government established its Climate 
Change Study Team (ccst), and the 
Kiribati Parliament set up its Parlia-
ment Select Committee on Climate 
Change (psccc) to promote people’s 
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involve fish canning, beef and/or 
poultry farming, fruit and vegetable 
cultivation, to name a few” (rnzi 
2014b). 
Central to our understanding 
of the issue is the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s latest report, which confirms 
that climate change is caused mainly 
by human activity (ipcc 2014). The 
report goes on to identify small island 
nations such as Kiribati as in danger 
of sinking, indicating as well that 
some people are already struggling 
to survive. President Tong has cam-
paigned vigorously on the idea that 
Islanders are the victims and others 
are the culprits. He has also claimed 
that his people will one day have to 
abandon their country and migrate to 
other countries (see, eg, Warne 2014). 
The term “climate-change refugees” 
has troubled President Tong, who 
stresses that people should “migrate 
with dignity” (Lagan 2013). As a 
long-term plan to prepare its people 
for migration, the government has 
invested in education and upgraded 
the Tarawa Technical Institute to 
Australia and New Zealand stan-
dards. Australia and New Zealand 
have been identified as two possible 
destinations for the people of Kiri-
bati. However, the two countries have 
publicly dismissed the idea of accept-
ing climate-change refugees, saying 
they are assisting Kiribati in differ-
ent ways. Every year, New Zealand 
accepts seventy-five individuals from 
Kiribati to become residents under 
its “Pacific Access” category. It has 
also provided Recognised Seasonal 
Employment (rse) to certain Pacific 
Islanders including I-Kiribati; a similar 
scheme (the Pacific Seasonal Worker 
Pilot Scheme, or pswps) was later 
introduced by Australia. On the other 
hand, Fiji has declared that it will not 
turn its back on Kiribati should the 
need arise to evacuate its population 
(see, eg, Liljas 2014). 
In 2006, the Kiribati govern-
ment first declared the creation of 
the Phoenix Islands Protected Area 
(pipa). In 2008, formal regula-
tions were adopted for it, and two 
years later it was added to the list 
of unesco World Heritage sites. In 
October 2013, Tong’s government 
established a $2.5 million endowment 
for pipa, which was matched by a 
grant in the same amount from the 
Global Conservation Fund of Con-
servation International to start a trust 
fund to preserve the marine resources 
for future generations (iucn 2013). 
The government has opened a new 
embassy at the United Nations in New 
York; the country also has embassies 
in Taiwan and Fiji (pina 2013). Refut-
ing criticisms regarding the high cost 
of foreign embassies, the president 
maintains that the new embassies are 
part of his government’s foreign policy 
to ensure that they do not miss out on 
any opportunity and that their voices 
are heard at the international level.
In May 2013, Jimmie Rodg-
ers, head of the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (spc), stated, 
“Pacific islands are the victims of 
industrial countries unable to con-
trol their carbon dioxide emissions. 
The truth of the matter is that we 
have no option but to accept this and 
adapt” (Wéry 2013). In September 
2013, under the theme “Marshal-
ling the Pacific Response to Climate 
Change,” the Pacific Islands Forum 
met in the Marshall Islands, where 
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the leaders deliberated on their posi-
tion on climate-change adaptation 
and pushed for mitigation efforts 
on the part of developed countries. 
In July 2014, a few days before the 
annual Kiribati independence celebra-
tions, Tong  convened the Coalition 
of Atoll Nations on Climate Change 
(cancc) in Tarawa with leaders from 
the  Marshall Islands, Maldives, and 
Tuvalu (rnzi 2014a; pina 2014).
Jon Palfreman has argued that it 
would be hard to change the mindset 
of world leaders because many are 
skeptical about the scientific valid-
ity of climate-change science (2006). 
Climate change is of course a topic 
subject to debate and interpreta-
tion, but on the ground it is a reality. 
Partnering with Island nations and 
donors to speed up awareness and 
adaptation, the South Pacific Regional 
Environmental Programme (sprep) 
has undertaken a series of regional 
meetings and trainings for govern-
ments, civil society, and the media to 
promote climate-change adaptation 
(sprep 2014). Developed countries 
and donors are aware of their respon-
sibilities to help nations with funds to 
adapt to the changes. Nevertheless, 
small island nations such as Kiri-
bati claim that these are not enough 
to reduce their vulnerability and to 
increase their capacity to adapt. 
This is how climate change has 
set a new standard for relationships 
between smaller nations and indus-
trialized countries. Their interaction 
is very much influenced by the rec-
ognition of risk and responsibility 
(Beck 2000), in the sense that evi-
dence strongly suggests that people 
in Kiribati and other smaller nations 
are at risk and that responsibility rests 
equally with developed countries. 
The disconnection between what is 
written and what is said about chal-
lenges posed by climate change and 
ways to respond to the changes receive 
little attention. For instance, Tong 
has repeatedly promoted the idea 
of constructing a “floating island” 
(Fox 2013), and he has attempted to 
answer questions posed by interna-
tional journalists based on “what if it 
happens” scenarios. In addition, there 
are claims that Tong is deliberately 
using climate change to seek funds 
from the international community and 
distract attention from major issues 
such as overcrowding, unemployment, 
 pollution, and health problems (see, 
eg, Lagan 2013). Getting the interna-
tional community to solve as many 
problems as possible because they 
seem to be linked to climate change 
is a card now being played by the 
 president and other Pacific leaders.
For biblical reasons, some Christian 
denominations have downplayed the 
seriousness and urgency of the gov-
ernment’s campaign. Many elders are 
very reluctant to talk about leaving 
because they do not understand what 
is happening and where they would 
be going. The media are caught in 
the “victim vs culprit” debate but 
have at times published or broadcast 
sensational and emotional stories 
illustrating people’s feelings and 
ideas about the unknown future (Day 
2011; Korauaba 2012). Recently, an 
 I-Kiribati man applied for  refugee 
 status in New Zealand, but his appli-
cation was turned down because 
 current international law doesn’t 
recognize climate-change refugees. The 
man is now overstaying in New Zea-
land and awaiting deportation (Radio 
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Australia 2014). The Kiribati gov-
ernment is not involved in this case, 
despite earlier pleas by the president in 
support of migration as an alternative 
due to climate change and sea-level 
rise. A few days before the general 
election in New Zealand in September 
2014, the National Party announced 
that climate-change refugees would 
not be allowed into New Zealand 
(pmc 2014).
Despite the sense of urgency in Kiri-
bati and in many other Pacific Island 
countries to address climate change, 
this reviewer feels that several measures 
being proposed are  inappropriate. 
Climate change is a political issue, and 
leaders and  activists are busy casting 
blame on others for destroying nature. 
Overwhelmed by the gravity of the 
debate, the Kiribati government has 
rushed through a few projects and 
made irrelevant and inconsistent mes-
sages to the world. Purchasing land in 
Fiji lacks proper planning, and propos-
ing a floating island may  confuse and 
frighten people. Training and prepar-
ing people to migrate with skills and 
qualifications recognized in particular 
countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand is problematic if those coun-
tries will not currently accept climate-
change migrants or  refugees. Several 
churches have opposed the govern-
ment’s position on climate change, and 
the elderly renewed their allegiance 
to their country. In general, some of 
the government’s activities to address 
climate change are too broad and hard 
to put together. However, this reviewer 
understands that their main objective 
has been to tell the world that Tong, 
who now appears to be a climate-
change activist rather than a leader, is 
genuine and serious about his country. 
Apart from climate change, the 
president had sacked three of his 
cabinet ministers for misconduct. 
Communications, Transport and 
 Tourism Minister Taberannang 
Timeon and Public Works and Energy 
Minister Kirabuke Teiaua resigned 
amid  controversy over allegations of 
receiving excessive sitting  allowances 
(rnzi 2013; Islands Business 2013). 
Timeon was a key member and 
founder of the ruling Boutokaan Te 
Koaua Party. The party’s philosophy 
is to uphold and support the truth. 
Timeon later told the local media 
that he did not want to step down 
because he believed that he had not 
done anything wrong, but he resigned 
because he respected the president’s 
power according to the constitution. 
Timeon is still sticking with the party 
despite being sacked and even though 
his chances to  succeed Tong are slim 
due to his age and the alleged mis-
conduct. Toward the end of 2013, the 
government heavily campaigned on 
the rights and  protection of women, 
which resulted in the introduction of 
a new Family Bill and the establish-
ment of the new Ministry for Women 
and Youth. In early 2014, President 
Tong sacked Minister of Labour Boutu 
Bateriki after he was reported to have 
beaten his former wife and appeared 
in court for that offense (rnzi 2014c). 
Five women in Kiribati were murdered 
by their husbands or former partners 
between January and June 2014. The 
men are being held in prison awaiting 
their trials. Following public discon-
tent and outcry about the murders, in 
September Parliament unanimously 
passed the first reading of a bill to 
amend the penal code and reinstate 
the introduction of the death penalty 
political reviews • micronesia 237
for murderers. Leaders of the Catholic 
and Protestant churches criticized the 
bill, saying it will erode Christianity, 
and therefore called on their members 
to oppose it (Edmonds 2014).
The notion of disappearing nations, 
a common theme arising from the 
debate on climate change, has shaped 
and influenced our knowledge about 
science and small nations such 
as Kiribati. This is not to dispute 
 scientific findings that these islands 
are in danger of sinking due to climate 
change and sea-level rise. There is 
danger and the need to take action is 
now. However, Tong’s government has 
spent much time, energy, and effort 
on climate change, and as a result 
short- and medium-term challenges 
such as overcrowding, unemployment, 
environmental pollution, and urban 
shift have often been overlooked. 
These challenges existed in Kiribati 
prior to independence. We are now 
witnessing one of the most  challenging 
issues of our time, one that calls on 
leaders such as Tong to carefully 
and thoroughly plan their strategies. 
Taking unnecessary measures is not 
just costly but also expends time and 
energy. Leaders such as President Tong 
need to continually check and balance 
their attitudes and motives to ensure 
that they are consistent with their own 
government’s policies.
taberannang korauaba
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Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands
The impacts of climate change came 
into urgent focus for the US Com-
monwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands (CNMI) during the period 
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under review. A report issued by the 
CNMI Climate Change Working 
Group (ccwg) identified nearly all of 
the villages and resources along the 
western coast of Saipan, the archi-
pelago’s main island, as being criti-
cally vulnerable to sea-level rise and 
changes in rainfall patterns. Saipan’s 
western coastal plain includes natural 
habitat areas, residential neighbor-
hoods, the primary business district of 
Garapan, many of the island’s hotels, 
restaurants, and shopping centers, and 
vital infrastructure from roads and the 
seaport to power facilities. The vulner-
ability assessment urged that climate-
change considerations be prioritized 
for western low-lying areas and better 
integrated with flood-control studies 
and development plans. The Climate 
Change Working Group’s study was 
also part of the US Global Change 
Research Program’s National Climate 
Assessment that was submitted to 
the White House in May 2014; that 
national report highlighted sea-level 
rise, reduced freshwater supplies, 
and coral bleaching among the major 
climate-change threats to communi-
ties across the Pacific Islands, includ-
ing the CNMI (usgcrp 2014; ccwg 
2014; st, 18 Feb, 14 May, 18 June 
2014). 
The CNMI Climate Change Work-
ing Group consisted of representatives 
from approximately thirty local and 
federal agencies, led by the Division 
of Coastal Resources Management. 
The division’s director, Fran Castro, a 
longtime environmental advocate and 
public servant, was also elected during 
the period under review to chair the 
Pacific Regional Ocean Partnership 
(prop), the members of which are 
appointed by the governors of the 
CNMI, American Sāmoa, Guam, and 
Hawai‘i to identify coastal and ocean 
management priorities that require a 
coordinated regional response (st, 18 
Feb 2014). CNMI Governor Eloy S 
Inos himself put a spotlight on climate 
change as chair of the 19th Microne-
sian Chief Executives Summit, which 
convened on Saipan in December 
2013. Declaring climate change “the 
most common concern we share as 
a region,” Inos called for continued 
partnership among the Micronesian 
Island jurisdictions and nations to 
“demand action against large carbon 
emission producing nations devastat-
ingly contributing to climate change 
and adversely impacting our fragile 
island communities” (Eugenio 2014). 
The CNMI sought enhanced 
regional cooperation in other areas as 
well during the period under review, 
particularly with the neighboring 
US territory of Guam. In Septem-
ber 2013, Governor Inos and Guam 
Governor Eddie B Calvo convened 
the First Marianas Summit to explore 
issues of mutual interest, including 
coordination and information shar-
ing between the two jurisdictions in 
managing the US military buildup 
(mv, 23 Sept 2013). Throughout the 
year, Inos sounded a markedly cau-
tious note in his approach to military 
activities in the archipelago, calling for 
greater oversight by CNMI regulatory 
agencies, and raising concerns about 
proposed live-fire training exercises on 
Tinian and Pagan. Inos also objected 
to the proposed establishment of a 
divert airfield on the main island of 
Saipan, urging instead that the mili-
tary develop its long-neglected leased 
land on neighboring Tinian, which 
comprises two-thirds of that island 
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(Inos 2014; st, 31 July 2013). The 
Marianas governors also discussed 
possibilities for a future interisland 
cargo and passenger ferry system and 
for the promotion of agricultural 
commerce between the islands (mv, 23 
Sept 2013; st, 22 Sept 2013). 
Similarly, the Mariana Islands 
Legislature Association (mila) held 
its first general assembly of Guam 
and CNMI lawmakers in November 
2013 on Guam, with plans to rotate 
 sessions within the Marianas archipel-
ago as part of a new joint legislative 
effort to address political, social, and 
economic concerns shared between 
the two  jurisdictions (pnc 2013). 
Among the first successful outcomes 
of this endeavor was the enactment of 
legislation in May 2014 that relaxed 
Guam’s quarantine rules to remove 
testing requirements and other restric-
tions deemed unnecessary or out-
moded for the export of live cattle 
from the CNMI to Guam (st, 23 May 
2014). Two months after the law was 
signed, the first shipment of CNMI 
cattle arrived on Guam, and more are 
expected to follow (mv, 28 July 2014). 
US Federal-CNMI relations 
improved in some ways under the 
Inos administration during the 
period under review. The relation-
ship between the CNMI and federal 
governments was notoriously rocky 
during the term of Inos’s predeces-
sor, now-disgraced former Governor 
Benigno R Fitial. As Fitial’s lieutenant 
governor, Inos came into power after 
Fitial hastily resigned and departed 
the commonwealth for the Philippines 
in February 2013 amid impeachment 
proceedings and allegations of public 
corruption. The shift in federal-CNMI 
relations was most evident in the col-
laboration between the US delegate for 
the CNMI, Gregorio “Kilili” Sablan, 
and Governor Inos. On immigra-
tion matters, Sablan and Inos jointly 
pushed for a five-year extension of the 
federal CNMI-only transitional guest 
worker program, which was due to 
expire in December 2014. The exten-
sion was granted administratively by 
US Labor Secretary Thomas Perez 
and took effect in June 2014, after the 
Department of Labor determined that 
continuing the transitional worker 
program would ensure the availabil-
ity of a sufficient number of workers 
for legitimate businesses in the com-
monwealth (US Department of Labor 
2014; st, 29 May 2014). 
Citing 2010 census results that 
pegged the US citizen population at 
24,000 and the non-US citizen popu-
lation at nearly 30,000, and noting 
the estimated 24 percent unemploy-
ment rate among US citizens in the 
CNMI, the US labor secretary con-
cluded that even if all US workers 
were employed there would still not 
be enough workers to fill all available 
jobs (US Department of Labor 2014). 
The transitional worker program is 
now due to expire in December 2019 
and may be renewed again indefinitely 
in up to five-year increments at the 
labor secretary’s discretion, unless the 
law is amended as Delegate Sablan 
has proposed. Sablan introduced a 
bill that would effectively bar future 
five-year extensions of the transi-
tional worker program, a response 
perhaps to criticism from advocates 
seeking a more permanent status for 
the CNMI’s foreign workers and 
from those who say the CNMI must 
focus more resources on training US 
workers to take over jobs currently 
held by non-US workers (st, 15 July 
2014; US Senate 2014). Additionally, 
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Sablan’s bill would extend to 2019 
the visa program for foreign investors 
who opened businesses in the CNMI 
prior to the application of federal 
immigration law in 2009. Further, the 
bill would extend to 2019 the bar on 
political asylum claims in the CNMI, 
seen as crucial for continuing the visa-
free entry of Chinese tourists, one of 
the commonwealth’s fastest-growing 
markets. Governor Inos supported 
this bill, a similar version of which 
was approved by the US Senate in 
June 2014 (s1237), and Inos urged 
US House Speaker John Boehner to 
prioritize its passage in the US House 
of Representatives (st, 15 July, 20 
June 2014). 
Remaining in limbo during the year 
under review was the future immigra-
tion status of the CNMI’s foreign 
workers and other key groups who 
were legally present in the islands 
before the US Congress applied federal 
immigration law in 2009. In another 
departure from his predecessor, Gov-
ernor Inos backed Delegate Sablan’s 
proposal to provide a pathway to US 
citizenship to these groups. Sablan’s 
provisions were incorporated into 
national comprehensive immigration 
reform legislation that was still pend-
ing in the US Congress at the time of 
this writing. Not all of the CNMI’s 
leaders agreed with the proposal, how-
ever. In November 2013, the CNMI 
House of Representatives issued a 
resolution that opposed Sablan’s 
legislation, expressing fears of change 
in the social, political, and economic 
landscape of the islands should for-
eign nationals, who now outnumber 
Chamorros and Carolinians, secure 
permanent immigration status (House 
Resolution 18-34; st, 15 Nov 2013). 
The resolution prompted calls from 
Governor Inos for unity on immigra-
tion reform (mv, 26 Nov 2013) and 
drew criticism from Delegate Sablan 
for the resolution’s legal and factual 
inaccuracies, which he said made the 
CNMI look “foolish” (mv, 1 July 
2014; st, 11 Nov, 12 Nov 2013). 
Internal politics were contentious 
on other fronts. As if the CNMI’s 
ubiquitous poker machine parlors 
were not enough, the government 
moved to dramatically expand the 
gaming industry through the enact-
ment of legislation that legalized 
government-run video lottery termi-
nals, electronic gaming in hotels, and, 
most controversially, casino gaming 
on the island of Saipan (st, 7 Oct, 16 
Dec 2013; st, 6 March 2014). Casino 
gaming was legalized years before on 
neighboring islands Tinian and Rota 
through ballot initiatives approved by 
voters on those islands. One casino 
exists on Tinian and the industry has 
yet to take off on Rota. Saipan voters 
have twice rejected casino initia-
tives on their island, most recently in 
2007, and Rota and Tinian lawmak-
ers  (especially in the Senate, where 
they comprise six of nine members) 
have long blocked attempts to legalize 
casino gaming on Saipan through stat-
ute (st, 26 Nov 2013; 6 March 2014). 
During the year under review, how-
ever, several Rota and Tinian legisla-
tors crossed aisles to join a majority of 
Saipan lawmakers—including Saipan 
lawmakers who used to oppose casino 
gaming on the island—in passing a 
Saipan casino law that was developed 
in coordination with the Inos adminis-
tration. The legislation moved swiftly, 
passing both chambers of the legisla-
ture over the course of just two days 
in March 2014, after being introduced 
in the House barely a month before. 
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No public hearing was held, nor was 
a committee report produced, and 
Governor Inos signed the bill into law 
days later (st, 6 March 2014). The 
law was amended almost immediately 
afterward to correct ambiguities and 
conflicts that were missed during the 
hustle, and Governor Inos issued a 
request for proposals for an exclusive 
forty-year Saipan casino license on 
1 April 2014—the same day that he 
signed the amendments into law (Pub-
lic Law 18-38; Public Law 18-43; st, 
2 April 2014). 
The handful of lawmakers who 
opposed the Saipan casino bill ques-
tioned the rush (st, 13 June 2014). 
In response, Senate President Ralph 
Torres of Saipan (who used to oppose 
casino gaming on the island and voted 
against it as recently as November 
2013 before voting for it five months 
later) declared that times had changed. 
Torres cited, in particular, the plight of 
retirees, the demands of land com-
pensation claimants, and the needs 
of the public hospital as his primary 
motivations for voting yes on the 
Saipan casino bill (mv, 4 March 2014). 
However, the problems he mentioned 
had existed in November 2013 and 
long before that time as well. Perhaps 
something else had changed. 
What may have made a major dif-
ference in lawmakers’ votes on casino 
legislation this time around occurred 
in the form of a series of “fact-
finding” trips to Hong Kong and 
Macau undertaken between Novem-
ber 2013 and early 2014 by several 
key officials, including Governor 
Inos, Senate President Torres, Senate 
Vice President Victor Hocog of Rota, 
Tinian Senators Francisco Borja and 
Joaquin Borja, and Saipan Represen-
tative Ralph Demapan. The trips were 
apparently paid for by casino inves-
tors whose names were not disclosed, 
nor were details of their meetings 
publicly revealed. Governor Inos, 
Senate President Torres, and other 
lawmakers subsequently claimed that 
the investors who funded the travel 
did not participate in the bidding 
process, but those claims were belied 
by later reports indicating that in 
November 2013, the parent company 
of Saipan casino bidder Best Sun-
shine International, formerly called 
First Natural Foods (now Imperial 
Pacific International), had purchased 
Macau junket promoter Hengsheng 
Group for hk$400 million (us$51 
million) and that investors with ties 
to the Hengsheng Group had hosted 
the CNMI officials’ “fact-finding” 
trips (Cohen 2014; st, 24 April 2014; 
Asia  Gambling Brief, 4 Dec 2013). 
Shortly after these “fact-finding” 
travels, in February 2014 Represen-
tative Ralph Demapan introduced 
Saipan casino legislation in the House 
and shepherded the bill to passage in 
a matter of weeks. The crucial votes 
in the Senate in favor of the bill came 
from Senators Ralph Torres,  Victor 
Hocog, Joaquin Borja, and Frank 
Borja, as well as from Saipan Senator 
Pete Reyes, another former opponent 
of casino gaming in his district (mv, 
4 March 2014). 
The Saipan casino law was mired 
in controversy from the start. Mul-
tiple parties filed litigation challenging 
the law, all alleging misconduct and 
violations of law by public officials. 
One of the lawsuits was filed by 
Marianas Stars Entertainment Inc, a 
Hong Kong–based casino investment 
group with interests on Tinian and one 
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of two bidders for the Saipan casino 
license (st, 20 June 2014). Marianas 
Stars also alleged that license competi-
tor Best Sunshine engaged in improper 
business tactics: during the short-
lived casino license competition, Best 
Sunshine’s aggressive marketing blitz 
promised not only a massive $2 bil-
lion, 2,000-room casino resort devel-
opment and the $30 million deposit 
that would go immediately toward 
satisfying retirement obligations, but 
also a $20 million community chest 
fund, and $10 million in cash vouch-
ers for every eligible adult to help pay 
for utilities (GGRAsia 2014). 
One taxpayer lawsuit sought to 
nullify the Saipan casino law on the 
grounds that the legislature had failed 
to comply with public notice require-
ments in the CNMI’s Open Govern-
ment Act (st, 19 May 2014). Attor-
neys for the government responded 
by claiming that application of the 
sunshine law to the legislature was 
unconstitutional, notwithstanding 
overwhelming voter approval of a 
ballot initiative in 2007 that explicitly 
applied the Open Government Act 
to the legislature (st, 12 June 2014). 
Casino opponents mounted petitions 
for a referendum on the casino law 
to be placed on the November 2014 
ballot. When it looked as though 
their efforts were beginning to gain 
traction, the legislature repealed and 
reenacted the casino law in its entirety 
in July 2014—effectively nullifying 
the petition, which was based on the 
previous law (Public Law 18-56; st, 
11 July 2014). 
The new casino law also authorized 
the lottery commission to issue the 
Saipan casino license in the absence of 
a duly organized casino commission, 
responding in part to the stalling of 
the confirmation process for Gover-
nor Inos’s casino commission picks. 
Representative Ramon Tebuteb, a 
known casino opponent who chaired 
the legislative delegation responsible 
for confirmation of executive appoint-
ments, raised questions about possible 
conflicts of interest among the com-
mission nominees, all of whom were 
retirees who stood to benefit from 
the issuance of a casino license, as the 
bulk of the license fees were to be used 
to pay out pensions. Tebuteb refused 
to hold hearings on the commission 
nominations until these and other 
questions were resolved (Public Law 
18-56; st, 23 May 2014). The lottery 
commission, on the other hand, was 
already formed and active and com-
prised the heads of the Department of 
Finance, Department of Commerce, 
Office of the Attorney General, and 
Department of Public Safety—all 
executive branch cabinet members 
serving at the pleasure of the governor 
(st, 26 Nov 2013). Four days after 
the new casino law was enacted, the 
lottery commission voted unanimously 
to award the Saipan casino license 
to Best Sunshine (st, 15 July 2014; 
Garlitos 2014). 
The Saipan casino law and the way 
it was passed dealt yet another blow to 
public trust in a community still stung 
by a series of high-profile government 
corruption scandals that marked six 
years under the Fitial administration. 
Several of those cases were still mov-
ing through the justice system during 
the period under review. In Febru-
ary 2014, former CNMI Attorney 
General Edward T Buckingham was 
convicted in Superior Court on seven 
of eight criminal charges involving 
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misconduct in office and conspiracy 
to commit theft of services. He had 
been accused of misusing  government 
resources to sponsor a political 
campaign event, to evade service of a 
penal summons, and to obtain legal 
counsel through the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office for his  criminal proceed-
ings. Superior Court Judge Kenneth 
Govendo sentenced Buckingham to a 
$14,000 fine but ordered no jail time. 
Govendo opted instead to place the 
disgraced former law enforcement 
officer on  unsupervised probation for 
three and a half years in consideration 
of  Buckingham’s poor health and 
the nonviolent nature of the crimes. 
As a convicted felon, Buckingham, 
age sixty-five, was also barred from 
returning to  government service in the 
CNMI for twenty years (st, 20 Feb 
2014). 
Meanwhile, Buckingham’s 
 codefendants in one theft-of-services 
conspiracy include former Deputy 
Police Commissioner Ambrosio T 
Ogumoro, former Ports Police Chief 
Jordan Kosam, and former Ports 
Police Captain John Rebuenog. 
These former officers were accused of 
providing Buckingham with an early-
morning police escort to the Saipan 
international airport in August 2012 
to help him avoid service of a penal 
summons by investigators from the 
Office of the Public Auditor (opa). 
That police escort prompted the opa 
investigators to enlist the help of two 
agents from the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, who ultimately served 
Buckingham with the summons inside 
the airport terminal, where Buck-
ingham was about to board a flight 
out of the CNMI. As of this writing, 
Ogumoro, Kosam, and Rebuenog still 
awaited the disposition of their crimi-
nal cases (mv, 25 July 2014). 
Also awaiting trial was the highest-
ranking codefendant in the conspiracy: 
former Governor Fitial himself. Fitial 
was the first CNMI governor to be 
impeached for corruption, neglect of 
duty, and abuse of power; the first 
to resign from office; and the first to 
face criminal charges. He departed the 
CNMI the same day he resigned from 
office in February 2013. Just as law-
makers were beginning to clamor for 
his extradition, Fitial returned to the 
CNMI from the Philippines in April 
2014 to answer the criminal charges 
against him (st, 1 May 2014). Some 
of the charges were related to the role 
he allegedly played in ordering the law 
enforcement escort for Buckingham. 
Fitial was also accused of misusing his 
office when he allegedly ordered the 
release of a federal prisoner to provide 
him with a massage at his home in 
2010 and when he allegedly awarded 
sole-sourced contracts that violated 
CNMI procurement law, including a 
$190 million power purchase agree-
ment (mv, 25 July 2014). 
The criminal cases against the 
aforementioned public officials were 
all filed by the Office of the Public 
Auditor, which under the leadership of 
Public Auditor Michael Pai and Inves-
tigations Chief/Special Prosecutor 
George Hasselback began to flex its 
investigative and prosecutorial muscle 
against government waste, fraud, and 
abuse in ways not seen before. Pai 
was appointed by Fitial in 2008—a 
decision Fitial later called “the biggest 
regret of [his] life” (mv, 6 Aug 2012)—
and his term expires in October 2014. 
As of this writing, Governor Inos has 
yet to decide whether he will reap-
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point Pai to another six-year term (st, 
18 March 2014). Not reappointing 
him could affect Inos’s gubernatorial 
aspirations in the upcoming Novem-
ber 2014 election, if growing mistrust 
in government emerges as a salient 
issue among voters as it did in the 
2012 midterm election when nearly all 
of Fitial’s allies in the legislature were 
ousted.
Also of note for the 2014 election 
is that, for the first time in CNMI 
history, voters will choose the next 
attorney general. Previously, the posi-
tion was appointed by the governor 
and generally rubber-stamped by the 
legislature. The elected attorney gen-
eral initiative garnered the approval of 
an overwhelming majority of voters in 
the 2012 midterm election—82 per-
cent—and, arguably, it was public out-
rage at the conduct of Buckingham, 
who had been appointed by Fitial and 
was widely seen as his “yes-man,” that 
made that happen (cec 2012). Buck-
ingham was ultimately replaced by 
Tinian attorney Joey San Nicolas, who 
was also appointed by Fitial but who 
distanced himself somewhat from the 
administration with a vow to restore 
public trust in the Office of the Attor-
ney General. San Nicolas cooperated 
with the Office of the Public Auditor 
in the aforementioned public corrup-
tion investigations and recused himself 
and his office from the prosecutions 
of the former attorney general and 
governor to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety. San Nicolas subsequently 
resigned as attorney general in June 
2014 in order to run for mayor of 
Tinian, while retired Judge Edward 
Manibusan and former Prosecutor 
Michael Evangelista declared their 
candidacies for chief law enforcement 
officer of the CNMI (st, 21 March, 28 
July 2014). 
Political shuffles occurred in other 
arenas during the period under review. 
In July 2013, Rota Senator Juan M 
Ayuyu pleaded guilty in US District 
Court to charges related to the smug-
gling of federally protected Mariana 
fruit bats from Rota to Saipan (st, 22 
July 2013). He was sentenced to forty-
one months in US federal prison, and 
his conviction resulted in a vacancy in 
the Senate that was filled in Novem-
ber 2013 by Paul A Manglona, the 
seasoned politician who had been 
ousted by Rota voters the year before, 
in the 2012 midterm election. Man-
glona was declared the next-highest 
vote getter from the last election in 
line to fill the vacancy, after the CNMI 
Supreme Court issued a ruling on the 
constitutional rules of succession and 
the meaning of the term “last elec-
tion” with respect to the Senate, which 
consists of members with staggered 
four-year terms. According to the 
Supreme Court, “last election” meant 
the most recent election, and not the 
election that was won by the depart-
ing public official (CNMI Supreme 
Court 2013). Manglona will serve out 
the remainder of Ayuyu’s term, which 
expires in January 2015; he is simul-
taneously running for a new four-year 
term in 2014 (st, 18 Nov 2013). 
The political shuffle that arose 
from the merging of the Republi-
can and Covenant parties also made 
headlines during the period under 
review. Former Governor Fitial first 
proposed the merger in 2011, when 
he was readmitted as a Republican 
and abandoned the Covenant Party, 
a Republican splinter group that he 
had been instrumental in founding a 
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decade before (st, 7 Jan 2011). But 
Fitial’s readmission instead prompted 
many Republicans who did not want 
to be associated with him to leave 
the party and form their own group, 
which they called the “Independent 
Republicans,” while Fitial’s lieuten-
ant governor, Inos, and his support-
ers opted to stay with the Covenant 
Party (st, 18 Sept 2013). In July 2013, 
Fitial formally tendered his resigna-
tion as chair of the Republican Party, 
and new party leadership was elected 
(st, 30 July 2013). Less than two 
months later, in September 2013, Inos 
returned to the Republican Party (to 
which he had also once belonged) 
and brought with him his Covenant 
supporters. A merger of the parties 
was proposed anew and approved by 
the members, and the Covenant Party 
was dissolved (st, 24 Sept 2013). Inos 
is now the Republican Party’s guber-
natorial candidate along with running 
mate Senate President Ralph Torres, 
who ran as an Independent in the 
2012 midterm election. Now the only 
other registered party in the CNMI 
is the Democratic Party, which has 
been plagued for years by lackluster 
leadership and inactivity and which 
struggled to revive itself during the 
period under review. 
Political parties in the CNMI con-
tinued to be driven more by person-
alities, family loyalties, and personal 
relationships than by ideology, as 
reflected in the frequency of party-
switching and the prevalence and 
successes of Independent candidates in 
recent years (candidates who are often, 
but not always, disgruntled Repub-
licans). In the race for US delegate, 
incumbent Gregorio Sablan declared 
his candidacy as an Independent, 
caucused with the National Demo-
cratic Party, and received the endorse-
ments of Covenant-then-Republican 
Governor Inos as well as the leader 
of the “Independent Republicans,” 
Saipan Senator Pete Reyes (mv, 1 Aug 
2014; st, 19 Feb 2014). Meanwhile, 
Sablan’s sole challenger was the 
CNMI Democratic Party candidate 
for delegate, former CNMI Commerce 
Secretary Andrew Salas, who used to 
be a Republican. In the gubernato-
rial race, the Democratic challengers 
to the Inos-Torres team were Edward 
M Deleon Guerrero (a former Com-
monwealth Ports Authority execu-
tive director who switched between 
Democratic, Republican, and Cov-
enant parties throughout his political 
career) and his running mate, former 
Representative Danny Quitugua (also 
a former Republican) (st, 14 March 
2014). Two other gubernatorial 
teams stepped forward to contest the 
election as Independents, all former 
Republicans: former Governor Juan N 
Babauta and his running mate, former 
Senator Juan Torres (st, 8 April, 17 
July 2014), and former House Speaker 
Heinz Hofschneider and his running 
mate, former Senator Ray Yumul (st, 
25 Feb 2014). 
Government retirees and active gov-
ernment employees were an important 
and influential constituency during the 
period under review, and they were 
subjected to much political manipu-
lation as well. In September 2013, 
the government reached a landmark 
settlement agreement with the CNMI 
Retirement Fund and its members 
that resulted in painful pension cuts 
but also averted disaster: the fund had 
been on track to be totally depleted by 
March 2014, and anxieties were high 
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among the thousands of fund benefi-
ciaries as litigation, and the count-
down, wore on. Prior to the settlement 
agreement, government obligations 
to the retirement fund stemming from 
years of failure to remit employer 
contributions had soared to more 
than $300 million—roughly three 
times the entire annual budget of the 
CNMI government. Additionally, the 
unfunded liability of the fund stood 
at close to one billion US dollars 
(mv, 3 Aug 2012). After the settle-
ment agreement was reached, pension 
cuts were capped at 25 percent (the 
government had initially proposed 
far greater cuts); active government 
employees were allowed to opt out of 
the fund and withdraw their contribu-
tions without penalty (and with local 
politicians’ promise of interest pay-
ments in the future); and the govern-
ment guaranteed annual payments 
to a settlement trust fund that would 
remain under the supervision of the 
US District Court and out of which 
pensions would be paid (st, 30 Sept 
2013). 
According to Governor Inos, the 
government’s obligations to fund 
beneficiaries would be met through 
revenues generated by the Saipan 
casino industry, namely, the $30 mil-
lion deposit that Best Sunshine was 
required to make as a show of com-
mitment and the annual $15 million 
casino license renewal fee. The pen-
sion cuts took effect in October 2013, 
and some fund members welcomed 
the Inos administration’s casino plan 
and became vocal advocates for it. In 
March 2014, with great fanfare at a 
Republican rally and with the Novem-
ber election just around the corner, 
Inos announced that pensions would 
soon be restored, drawing cheers and 
applause from supporters (mv, 14 July 
2014; st, 24 March, 16 July 2014). 
Another voting bloc that could 
make a significant difference in the 
2014 election if they become politi-
cally organized enough are the CNMI-
born, US-citizen children of foreign 
workers. According to some reports, 
their numbers were estimated at more 
than two thousand—over 10 percent 
of the entire voting population—a 
fact that did not go unnoticed by local 
politicians and guest-worker groups 
alike. Guided by their foreign-national 
parents, these new young voters began 
holding meetings among themselves 
and with political candidates to 
discuss the upcoming election. Can-
didates were seen wooing these new 
voters, and some candidates who once 
fiercely opposed permanent legal sta-
tus for foreign workers began soften-
ing their positions and clarifying what 
they really meant. The CNMI’s multi-
culturalism was an openly celebrated 
feature at political rallies, and the 
candidates’ positions on immigration 
reform became a routine part of public 
discourse on the campaign trail (st, 4 
Aug, 12 Aug 2014; mv, 30 Aug 2012; 
mv, 18 April, 29 July, 14 Aug 2014). 
Finally, the health of the local 
economy was a pivotal issue over the 
past year and will continue to be so in 
the years to come. The CNMI began 
to show modest signs of recovery and 
growth in recent years, including the 
year under review, with 472,000 total 
visitor arrivals projected for 2014, 
up 9 percent from the previous year; 
hotel occupancy on average over 85 
percent in 2014; and total projected 
economic activity of $1.27 billion 
in 2014 (Inos 2014; Ruane 2013). 
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Government revenue collections were 
up as well, with budget projections for 
the 2014–15 fiscal year conservatively 
pegged at $134 million—the highest 
in five years and an increase of about 
9 percent from the previous year’s 
projections (st, 3 April 2014; mv, 
1 April 2014). Still, serious challenges 
loom for the next administration and 
legislature in order to meet the gov-
ernment’s staggering fiscal obligations. 
On top of normal government opera-
tions, these obligations include annual 
payments in the tens of millions of US 
dollars to the retirement settlement 
trust fund; millions more owed in legal 
fees incurred from the retirement fund 
litigation; over $100 million owed in 
land compensation claims to more 
than three hundred landowners, as 
well as other judgments against the 
government; more than $20 million 
owed by the central government, the 
public school system, and the pub-
lic hospital to the Commonwealth 
Utilities Corporation (cuc) for utility 
services; and more than $64 million 
in fines and penalties alone for cuc’s 
chronic failure to address in timely 
fashion the federal stipulated orders 
that mandate the utility’s compliance 
with safe drinking water, used oil, and 
wastewater management standards 
in a timely manner (st, 11 July 2013; 
mv, 2 Oct 2013; st, 4 April, 7 April 
2014). One thing is clear: the next 
government should have a backup 
plan if a Saipan casino does not prove 
to be the economic panacea that some 
proponents promise it will be. 
christina sablan
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